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Abstract
For effective matching of resources (e.g., taxis,
food, bikes, shopping items) to customer demand,
aggregation systems have been extremely success-
ful. In aggregation systems, a central entity (e.g.,
Uber, Food Panda, Ofo) aggregates supply (e.g.,
drivers, delivery personnel) and matches demand
to supply on a continuous basis (sequential deci-
sions). Due to the objective of the central entity
to maximize its profits, individual suppliers get
sacrificed thereby creating incentive for individu-
als to leave the system. In this paper, we consider
the problem of learning approximate equilibrium
solutions (win-win solutions) in aggregation sys-
tems, so that individuals have an incentive to re-
main in the aggregation system.
Unfortunately, such systems have thousands of
agents and have to consider demand uncertainty
and the underlying problem is a (Partially Ob-
servable) Stochastic Game. Given the significant
complexity of learning or planning in a stochastic
game, we make three key contributions: (a) To
exploit infinitesimally small contribution of each
agent and anonymity (reward and transitions be-
tween agents are dependent on agent counts) in
interactions, we represent this as a Multi-Agent
Reinforcement Learning (MARL) problem that
builds on insights from non-atomic congestion
games model; (b) We provide a novel variance
reduction mechanism for moving joint solution
towards Nash Equilibrium that exploits the in-
finitesimally small contribution of each agent; and
finally (c) We provide detailed results on three dif-
ferent domains to demonstrate the utility of our
approach in comparison to state-of-the-art meth-
ods.
1Singapore Management University, Singapore. Correspon-
dence to: Tanvi Verma <tanviverma.2015@phdcs.smu.edu.sg>.
Copyright 2020 by the author(s).
1. Introduction
Due to having more information about state (e.g., location)
of supply (e.g., taxi/car drivers, delivery personnel) and
current demand, aggregation systems provide a significant
improvement in performance (Alonso-Mora et al., 2017;
Lowalekar et al., 2018; Verma and Varakantham, 2019;
Bertsimas et al., 2019) over decentralized decision making
methods (e.g., individual taxi drivers using their memory
and insights to find right locations when there is no customer
on board) in serving uncertain customer demand. However,
in aggregation systems, some suppliers can receive lower
profits (e.g., due to servicing low demand and high cost
areas) in maximizing overall profit for the centralized entity.
This results in suppliers moving out and creating instability
in the system. One way of addressing this instability is to
learn equilibrium solutions for all the players (centralized
entity and individual suppliers).
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) (Littman,
1994) with an objective of computing equilibrium is an ideal
model for representing aggregation systems. However, it is a
challenging problem for multiple reasons: (i) typically there
are thousands or tens of thousands of individual players; (ii)
there is uncertainty associated with demand; and (iii) this
is a sequential decision making problem, where decisions
at one step have an impact on decisions to be taken at next
step.
While there has been a significant amount of research on
learning equilibrium policies in MARL problems (Littman,
1994; Watkins and Dayan, 1992; Hu et al., 1998; Littman,
2001), most of them can only handle a few agents. Recently,
there have been Deep Learning based methods that can scale
to large numbers of agents such as Neural Fictitious Self
Play (NFSP) (Heinrich and Silver, 2016) and Mean Field
Q-Learning (Yang et al., 2018). However, neither of these
approaches are able to exploit some of the key properties of
aggregation systems (mentioned in the next paragraph) and
as we show in the experimental results, perform worse than
our approach.
To address the computational complexity, we exploit three
key aspects of aggregation systems. First, even though there
are thousands of individual players, their contribution to
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overall social welfare is infinitesimal. Second, similar to
congestion games, interactions among agents are anony-
mous (e.g., in traffic routing or network packet routing, the
cost incurred by an agent is dependent on the number of
other agents selecting the same path). Finally, as is typi-
cal in aggregation systems, centralized entities can provide
guidance to the individual suppliers.
Specifically, our key contributions are as follows: (a)
We propose a Stochastic Non-atomic Congestion Games
(SNCG) model to represent anonymity in interactions and
infinitesimal contribution of individual agents for aggrega-
tion systems; (b) We then provide key theoretical properties
of equilibrium in SNCG problems; (c) Most importantly, we
then propose an MARL approach (based on insights in (b))
for SNCG problems that reduces variance in agent values
to move joint solutions towards equilibrium solutions; and
(d) We provide detailed experimental results on multiple
benchmark domains from literature and compare against
leading MARL approaches.
2. Motivating Problems
Our work is motivated by MARL problems with large num-
ber of infinitesimally small agents , i.e., effect of single
agent on the environment dynamics is negligible. Also, the
interactions among the agents are anonymous.
Car aggregation companies like Uber, Lyft, Didi, Grab, Go-
jek etc. match car drivers to the customers demands. The
individual drivers make sequential decisions to maximize
their own long term revenue and they earn by competing
for demand with each other. Probability of a demand being
assigned to a car is dependent on the number of other cars
present in the origin location of the job and they can benefit
by learning to move to advantageous locations. Similarly,
food delivery systems (Deliveroo, Ubereats, Foodpanda, Do-
orDarsh etc.) and grocery delivery systems (AmazonFresh,
Deliv, RedMart etc) utilize services of delivery personnel to
serve the food/groceries to the customers.
Traffic routing is another example domain where travel-
ers take sequential decisions to minimize their own overall
travel time. Also, their travel time is affected by the conges-
tion on the road network and a centralized traffic controller
can provide guidance to drivers through information boards.
3. Related Work
For contributions in this paper, the most relevant research
is on computing equilibrium policies in MARL problems,
which is represented as learning in stochastic games (Shap-
ley, 1953). Minimax-Q (Littman, 1994) is one of the early
equilibrium-based MARL algorithm that uses minimax rule
to learn equilibrium policy in two-player zero-sum games.
Nash-Q learning (Hu et al., 1998) is another popular al-
gorithm that extends the classic single agent Q-learning
(Watkins and Dayan, 1992) to general sum stochastic games.
At each state, Nash-Q learning computes the Nash equilib-
ria for the corresponding single stage game and uses this
equilibrium strategy to update the Q-values. (Littman, 2001)
proposed Friend-or-Foe Q-learning (FFQ) which has less
strict convergence condition compared to Nash-Q. Another
algorithm similar to Nash-Q learning is correlated-Q learn-
ing (Greenwald et al., 2003) which uses value of correlated
equilibria to update the Q-values instead of Nash equilibria.
In fictitious self play (FSP) (Heinrich et al., 2015) agents
learn best response through self play. FSP is a learning
framework that implements fictitious play (Brown, 1951) in
a sample-based fashion. Unfortunately, all these algorithms
are generally suited for a few agents and do not scale if num-
ber of agents is very large, which is the case in problems of
interest in this paper.
Recently, few deep learning based algorithms have been
proposed to learn approximate Nash equilibrium. Neural
fictitious self play (NFSP) (Heinrich and Silver, 2016) com-
bines FSP with a neural network function approximation
to provide a decentralized learning approach. Due to de-
centralization, NFSP is extremely scalable and can work on
problems with many agents. Mean field Q-learning (MFQ)
(Yang et al., 2018) is a centralized learning decentralized
execution algorithm where individual agents learn Q-values
of its interaction with average action of its neighbour agents.
However, none of these approaches can directly exploit the
key properties of aggregation systems (infinitesimal con-
tribution of individual agents, anonymity in interactions,
presence of a guiding centralized entity) to improve solution
quality. As we demonstrate in our experimental results, our
approach that benefits from exploiting these key properties
of aggregation systems is able to outperform NFSP and
MFQ with respect to quality of -equilibrium solutions on
multiple benchmark problem domains from literature.
In this paper, we build on key results from non-atomic
congestion games (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002; Rough-
garden, 2007; Fotakis et al., 2009; Chau and Sim, 2003;
Krichene et al., 2015; Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2016) by ac-
counting for transitional uncertainty. While, there has been
some research (Angelidakis et al., 2013) on considering
uncertainty in congestion games, the uncertainty considered
there is in cost functions and not in state transitions. There
has been other work (Varakantham et al., 2012) that has
considered congestion in the context of stochastic games.
However, the focus there is on planning (and not learning)
without a centralized entity and there is also an approxima-
tion on value function considered in that work.
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4. Background: NCG
In this section we provide a brief overview of Non-atomic
Congestion Games (NCG) .
NCG has either been used to model selfish routing (Rough-
garden and Tardos, 2002; Roughgarden, 2007; Fotakis et
al., 2009) or resource sharing (Chau and Sim, 2003; Krich-
ene et al., 2015; Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2016) problems.
Though the underlying model is the same, there is a minor
difference in the way the model is represented. Here we
present a brief overview of NCG from the perspective of
resource sharing problem as that is of relevance to contri-
butions in this paper. For detailed exposition of NCG, we
refer the readers to (Krichene et al., 2015).
In NCG, a finite set of resources L are shared by a set
of players X . To capture the infinitesimal contribution of
each agent, the set X is endowed with a measure space:
(X ,M,m).M is a σ-algebra of measurable subsets, m is
a finite Lebesgue measure and is interpreted as the mass of
the agents. This measure is non-atomic, i.e., for an agent x,
m({x}) = 0. The set X is partitioned into K populations,
X = X1 ∪ ... ∪ XK .
Each population type k possesses a set of strategies Uk,
and each strategy corresponds to a subset of the resources.
Each agent selects a strategy, which leads to a joint strategy
distribution, a:
a = (fuk )u∈Uk,1≤k≤K with
∑
u∈Uk
fuk = m(Xk)∀k
Here fuk is the total mass of the agents from population k
who choose strategy u. The total consumption of a resource
l ∈ L in a strategy distribution a is given by:
φl(a) =
K∑
k=1
∑
u∈Uk:l∈u
fuk
The cost of using a resource l ∈ L for strategy a is:
cl(φ
l(a))
where the function cl(.) represents cost of congestion and is
assumed to be a non-decreasing continuous function. The
cost experienced by an agent of type k which selects strategy
u ∈ Uk is given by:
Cuk (a) =
∑
l∈u
cl(φ
l(a))
A strategy a is Nash equilibrium if:
∀k,∀u, u′ ∈ Uk : if fuk > 0, then Cu
′
k (a) ≥ Cuk (a)
Intuitively, it implies that the cost for any other strategy, u′
will be greater than or equal to the cost of strategy, u. In
other words, it also implies that for a population Xk, all the
strategies with non-zero mass will have equal costs.
5. Stochastic Non-atomic Congestion Games
We propose Stochastic Non-atomic Congestion Game
(SNCG) model to represent anonymity in interactions and
infinitesimal agents in aggregation systems by extending
non-atomic congestion games. Formally, SNCG is repre-
sented using the tuple:〈X ,S,K,A, T ,R〉
X : Similar to NCG, X is the set of agents endowed with a
measure space, (X ,M,m), whereM is a σ-algebra of
measurable subsets and m is a finite Lebesgue measure.
For an agent x, {x} is a null-set and m({x}) is zero.
K: is the set of local states of individual agents (e.g., location
of a taxi).
S: is the set of global states (e.g., distribution of taxis in the
city). The set of agents present in local state k in global
state s is given by X sk and the mass of agents present in
the local state, k is given by m(X sk ). The distribution of
mass of agents is considered as the global state, i.e.,
s =< m(X s1 ),m(X s2 ), ...,m(X s|K|) >, with
|K|∑
k=1
m(X sk ) = 1∀s ∈ S
The total mass of agents in any global state s is 1.
A: is the set of actions whereAk represents the set of actions
(e.g.,locations to move to) available to individual agents
in the local state k.
A = {Ak}k∈K
Let a(x) provides the action selected by agent x. We
define fuk (s) as the total mass of agents in X sk selecting
action u in state s, i.e.
∑
u∈Ak f
u
k (s) = m(X sk ). If the
agents are playing deterministic policies, fuk (s) is given
by
fuk (s) =
∫
x∈X sk
1(a(x)=u)dm(x) (1)
R : is the reward function1. The total mass of agents se-
lecting action u for a joint action a in state s is given
by
φu(a) =
|K|∑
k=1;u∈Ak
fuk (s)
Similar to the cost functions in NCG, the reward function
is assumed to be a non-decreasing continuous function.
1Researchers generally use the term ”cost” in the context of
NCG. To be consistent with the MARL literature we use the term
”reward”. However, reward and cost can be used interchangeably
by observing that reward is negative of cost.
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The immediate reward is dependent on the mass of the
agents selecting the same action. Also, all the agents
which select action u in local state k receive equal reward2
which is given by
Rk(s, φu(a))
T : is the transitional probability of global states given joint
actions. The global transition from the perspective of an
individual agent x is given by:
T (s′|s,a) = pk(k′|s, u,a−x) · T (s′−x|s,a)
pk(k
′|s, u,a−x) is the probability of moving to local
state k′ when an agent x ∈ X sk takes action u and the
induced joint action by all the agents is a. a−x is the
joint action induced by all the agents except x and s′−x is
the global state without agent x.
The policy of agent x is denoted by pix. We observe that
given a joint state s, an agent will play different policies
based on its local state k as the available actions for local
states are different. Hence, pix can be represented as
pix = (pixk(s))s∈S,k∈K such that
∑
u∈Ak
pixk(u|s) = 1
We define Πk as the set of policies available to an agent
in local state k, hence, pixk(s) ∈ Πk∀x ∈ Xk,∀s ∈ S.
pi = (pix)(x∈X ) is the joint policy of all the agents.
Let γ be the discount factor and ρpi denotes the state-action
marginals of trajectory distribution induced by the joint
policy pi. We use ρxpi to denote the local state-action tra-
jectory distribution of agent x induced by the joint policy
pi = (pix,pi−x), where pi−x is the joint policy of other
agents. The value of agent x for being in local state k given
the global state is s and other agents are following policy
pi−x is given by
vxk(s, pixk,pi−x) = E((s,a)∼ρpi ,(k′,u)∼ρxpi)
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtRk′(s, φu(a))
]
= Rk(s, φpixk(s)(a)) + γ
∑
s′−x∈S−x
T (s′−x|s,a)
∑
k′∈K
pk(k
′|s, pixk(s),a−x)vxk′(s′, pixk′ ,pi−x)
(2)
The goal in an SNCG is to compute an equilibrium joint strategy,
where no agent has an incentive with respect to their individual
value to unilaterally deviate from their solution.
Here, we provide key properties of value function and equilibrium
solution in SNCG that will later be used for developing a learning
method for SNCGs.
2In aggregation systems, expected reward is equal for all the
agents who perform the same action in a local state, i.e. who select
to move to the same zone.
Proposition 5.1. Values of other agents do not change if agent x
alone changes its policy. For any agent y in any local state k:
vyk(s, piyk,pi−y) = vyk(s, piyk,pi
′
−y)
where pi−y =
(
pix, (piz)z∈X\{x,y}
)
and pi′−y =(
pi′x, (piz)z∈X\{x,y}
)
Proof. Adapting Equation 2 for agent y in local state k, we have:
vyk(s, piyk,pi−y) = Rk(s, φpiyk(s)(a)) + γ
∑
s′−x∈S−x
T (s′−y|s,a)
∑
k′∈K
pk(k
′|s, piyk(s),a−y)vyk′(s′, piyk′ ,pi−y)
(3)
When policy of agent x is changed, the main factor that is impacted
in the RHS of the above expression is a and due to that, the reward
and transition terms can be impacted. a is solely dependent on
fuk (s) values and f
u
k (s) values are dependent on the mass of agents
taking action u in local state k and global state s (Equation 1):
fuk (s) =
∫
z∈Xs
k
1(a(z)=u)dm(z)
If policy change makes agent x move out of local state k then the
new mass of agents selecting action u in k is:
f˜uk (s) =
∫
z∈Xs
k
\{x}
1(a(x)=u)dm(x)
Since f is primarily mass of agents (which is a Lebesgue mea-
sure), using the countable additivity property of Lebesgue measure
(Bogachev, 2007; Hartman and Mikusinski, 2014), we have:
=
∫
z∈Xs
k
1(a(z)=u)dm(z)−
∫
z∈{x}
1(a(z)=u)dm(z)
(4)
Since integral at a point in continuous space is 0 and mass measure
is non-atomic, so we have {x} is a null set and m({x}) = 0
=
∫
z∈Xs
k
1(a(z)=u)dm(z) (5)
Since fuk (s) = f˜
u
k (s), action, a remains same. Hence neither
reward nor transition values change. Thus, RHS of Equation 3
remains same when pi−y is changed to pi′−y in the LHS.
5.1. Nash Equilibrium in SNCG
A joint policy pi is a Nash equilibrium if for all k and for all
x ∈ Xk, there is no incentive for anyone to deviate unilaterally,
i.e.
vxk(s, pixk,pi−x) ≥ vxk(s, pi′xk,pi−x)
∀s ∈ S, ∀x ∈ Xk, ∀k ∈ K, ∀pixk(s), pi′xk(s) ∈ Πk (6)
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Proposition 5.2. Values of agents present in a local state are
equal at equilibrium, i.e.,
vxk(s, pixk,pi−x) = vyk(s, piyk,pi−y),
∀s ∈ S, ∀x, y ∈ Xk,∀k ∈ K, ∀pixk(s), piyk(s) ∈ Πk (7)
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 5.1, we showed that adding
or subtracting one agent from a local state does not change other
agent’s values, as contribution of one agent is infinitesimal. Thus,
vxk(s, pixk,pi−x) = vxk(s, pixk,pi) and also
vxk(s, pi
′
xk,pi−x) = vxk(s, pi
′
xk,pi) (8)
This implies that the value is dependent only the policy of the
individual agent given its state and joint policy. Hence if agent
x in local state k gets a highest value of vxk(s, pixk,pi) over all
policies, then any other agent y in the same local state k should get
the same value. Otherwise, agent y can swap to the same policy
(all agents have access to the same set of policies in each local
state) being used by x. Thus,
vxk(s, pixk,pi) = vyk(s, piyk,pi)
and from the arguments in proof of Proposition 5.1, we have
vxk(s, pixk,pi−x) = vyk(s, piyk,pi−y)
When there are multiple types of agents, we can provide a similar
proof that values of same type of agents would be equal in a local
state at equilibrium.
While SNCG model is interesting, it is typically hard to get the
complete model before hand. Hence, we pursue a multi-agent
learning approach to compute high-quality and fair joint policies
in SNCG problems.
6. Value Variance Minimization Q-learning,
VMQ
We now provide a learning based approach for solving SNCG
problems by utilizing Proposition 5.2 in a novel way. As argued
in Proposition 5.2, the values of all the agents3 present in any
local state are equal at equilibrium. However please note that the
converse is not true, i.e., even if the values of agents in local states
are equal, the policy is not guaranteed to be an equilibrium policy.
For a joint policy to be an equilibrium policy, agents should also be
playing their best responses in addition to having values of agents
in same local states being equal.
This is an ideal insight for computing equilibrium solutions in
aggregation systems, as the centralized entity can focus on en-
suring values of agents in same local states are (close to) equal
by minimizing variance in values, while the individual suppliers
can focus on computing best responses.
VMQ is a centralized training decentralized execution algorithm
which assumes that during training a centralized entity has the
access to the current values of the agents. The role of the central
entity is to ensure that the exploration of individual agents moves
towards a joint policy where the variance in values of agents in a
local state is minimum. The role of the individual agents is to learn
3Values of all the agents of same type in a local state are equal if
there are multiple types of agent population present in the system.
their best responses to the historical behavior of the other agents
based on guidance from central entity.
Algorithm 1 provides detailed steps of the learning:
• Central agent suggests joint action ac based on the joint policy
it has estimated to all the individual agents. Line 11 of the
algorithm shows this step. For the central agent, we consider a
policy gradient framework to learn the joint policy. σ(s,a) is
the long term mean variance in the values of agents in all the
local states if they perform joint action a.
We define two parameterized functions: joint policy function
µ(s; θµ) and variance function σ(s,a; θσ). Since the goal is
to minimize variance, we will need to update joint policy pa-
rameters in the negative direction of the gradient of σ(s,a).
Hence, policy parameters θµ can be updated in the proportion
to the gradient −∇θµσ(s, µ(s; θµ); θσ). Using chain rule, the
gradient of the policy will thus be
−∇θµσ(s,µ(s; θµ); θσ) =
−∇θµµ(s; θµ)∇aσ(s,a; θσ)|a=µ(s;θµ) (9)
• Individual agents either follow the suggested action with 1
probability or play their best response policy with 1− 1 prob-
ability. While playing the best response policy, the individual
agents explore with 2 probability (i.e. 2 fraction of (1− 1)
probability) and with the remaining probability ((1− 2) frac-
tion of (1− 1)) they play their best response action. Line 13
shows this step. The individual agents x maintain a network
Qx(s, k, u; θx) to approximate the best response to historical
behavior of the other agents in local state k when global state is
s.
• Environment moves to the next state. All the individual agents
observe their individual reward and update their best response
values. Central agent observes the true-joint action a performed
by the individual agents. Based on the true joint-action and
variance in the values of agents, the central agent updates its
own learning.
As common with deep RL methods (Mnih et al., 2015; Foerster
et al., 2017), replay buffer is used to store experiences (J for the
central agent and Jx for individual agent x) and target networks
(parameterized with θ′) are used to increase the stability of learning.
We define Lθσ , Lθµ and Lθx as the loss functions of σ, µ and Qx
networks respectively. The loss values are computed based on mini
batch of experiences as follows
Lθσ = E(s,ν,a,s′)∼J
[(
ν + γ · σ(s′, µ(s′; θ′µ))− σ(s,a; θσ)
)2]
(10)
Lθµ = E(s)∼J
[
−∇θµµ(s; θµ)∇aσ(s, µ(s; θ′µ); θσ)
]
(11)
Lθx = E(s,k,u,r,s′,k′)∼Jx
[(
r + γ ·max
u′
Qx(s
′, k′, u′; θ′x)
−Qx(s, k, u; θx)
)2] (12)
Lθσ and Lθx are computed based on TD error (Sutton, 1988)
whereas Lθµ is computed based on the gradient provided in Equa-
tion 9.
7. Experiments
We perform experiments on three different domains, a single stage
packet routing (Krichene et al., 2014), muti-stage traffic routing
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Algorithm 1 VMQ
1: Initialize replay buffer J , action-variance network
σ(s,a; θσ), policy network µ(s; θµ) and corresponding
target networks with parameters θ′σ and θ
′
µ respectively
for the central agent
2: Initialize replay buffer Jx, action-value network
Qx(s, k, u; θx) and corresponding target network with
parameter θ′x for all the individual agents x
3: while not converged do
4: for k ∈ K do
5: for x ∈ Xk do
6: compute value of x, vxk =
maxuQx(s, k, u; θx)
7: end for
8: Compute νk, variance in vxk values for x ∈ Xk
9: end for
10: Compute mean variance ν =
1
|K|
∑
k∈K νk
11: Compute suggested joint action by the central entity
ac ← µ(s, θµ).
12: for all k ∈ K and for all agent x ∈ Xk do
13: with probability 1,
ux ← sample from ac
with remaining probability 1− 1
ux ← 2-greedy(Qx)
14: Perform action ux and observe immediate reward
rx and next local state k′
15: end for
16: Compute true joint action a and observe next state s′
17: Store transition (s, ν,a, s′) in J and respective tran-
sitions (s, kx, ux, rx, s′, k′x) in Jx for all agents x
18: Periodically update the network parameters by mini-
mizing the loss functions provided in Equations 10-
12
19: Periodically update the target network parameters
20: end while
Figure 1: Routing network
(a) Population X1
(b) Population X2
Figure 2: Variance in costs of agents for packet routing
example.
(Wiering, 2000), taxi simulator based on real-world and synthetic
data set (Verma et al., 2019; Verma and Varakantham, 2019). In
all these domains there is a central agent that assists (or provides
guidance to) individual agents in achieving equilibrium policies.
For example, a central traffic controller can provide suggestions to
the individual travelers where as aggregation companies can act as
a central entity for the taxi domain.
As argued in Proposition 5.2, for SNCG the values of all the agents
in a local state would be the same or variance in their values should
be zero. Hence, we use variance in the values of all the agents
as comparison measure (we use boxplots to show the variance).
We compare with three baseline algorithms: Independent Learner
(IL), neural fictitious self play (NFSP) (Heinrich and Silver, 2016)
and mean-field Q-learning (MFQ) (Yang et al., 2018). IL is a
traditional Q-Learning algorithm that does not consider the actions
performed by the other agents. Similar to VMQ, MFQ is also a
centralized training decentralized execution algorithm and it uses
joint action information at the time of training. However, NFSP is
a self play learning algorithm and learns from individual agent’s
local observation. Hence, for fair comparison, we provide joint
action information to NFSP as well. As mentioned by (Verma
and Varakantham, 2019), we also observed that the original NFSP
without joint action information performs worse that NFSP with
joint action information. We use the best results for NFSP.
Our neural network consisted of one hidden layer with 256 nodes.
We also used dropout layer between hidden and output layer to
prevent the network from overfitting. We used Adam optimizer
for all the experimental domains. Learning rate was set to 1e-5 for
all the experiments. For all the individual agents, we performed
-greedy exploration and it was decayed exponentially. Training
was stopped once  decays to 0.05. In all the experiments, each
individual agent maintained a separate neural network. We ex-
perimented with different values of aniticipatory parameter for
NFSP, we used 0.1 for Taxi Simulator and 0.8 for the remaining
two domains which provided the best results.
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Table 1: Comparison of policies and  values for packet
routing example
Method policy  value
Equilibrium Policy ((0, 0.187, 0.813), 0
(0.223, 0.053, 0.724))
VMQ ((0, 0.180, 0.820), 0.07
(0.220, 0.040, 0.740))
NFSP ((0.004, 0.116, 0.88), 0.792
(0.01, 0.164, 0.826))
MFQ ((0, 0.162, 0.838), 0.15
(0.220, 0.040, 0.740))
IL ((0.055, 0.176, 0.769), 0.971
(0.217, 0.088, 0.695))
(a) Population X1
(b) Population X2
Figure 3: Variance in values of agents for multi-stage traffic
routing
7.1. Packet Routing
We first performed experiments with a single stage packet routing
game (Krichene et al., 2014). Two population of agents X1 and X2
of mass 0.5 each share the network given in Figure 1. The first pop-
ulation sends packets from node A to node B, and the second pop-
ulation sends from node E to node F . Paths AB,ACDB,ADB
are available to agents in X1 whereas paths EF,ECDF,ECF
are available to agents in X2. The cost incurred on a path is sum
of costs on all the edges in the path. The costs functions for the
edges when mass of population on the edge is φ are given by:
cAB(φ) = φ + 2, cAC(φ) = φ/ 2, cAD(φ) = φ, cDB(φ) =
φ/ 3, cCD(φ) = 3φ, cEC(φ) = 1/ 2, cCF (φ) = φ, cDF (φ) =
φ/ 4, cEF (φ) = φ+ 1
If the cost functions are known, equilibrium policy can be com-
puted by minimizing Rosenthal potential function (Rosenthal,
(a) Mean reward of agents
(b) Variance in the values of agents
Figure 4: Taxi simulator using real-world data set
1973). We use equilibrium policy and costs on paths computed by
minimizing potential function to compare quality of the equilib-
rium policy learned. We performed experiments with 100 agents
of each type. We also compute  values of the learned policy,
which is the maximum reduction in the cost of an agent when
it changes its policy unilaterally. Table 1 compares the poli-
cies and  values where the first row contain values computed
using potential minimization method. The policy is represent
as ((piAB1 , piACDB1 , piADB1 ), (piEF2 , fECDF2 , piECF2 )), where pi
p
i
is the fraction of mass of population of type i selecting path p. We
see that the VMQ policy is closest to the equilibrium policy and 
value is also lowest as compared to NFSP, MFQ and IL.
The equilibrium cost on paths as computed by the potential mini-
mization method are: AB = 2, ACDB = ADB = 1.14, EF =
ECDF = ECF = 1.22, i.e. at equilibrium agents in population
X1 incur a cost of 1.14 whereas cost for agents in population X2
is 1.22. Figures 2a and 2b provide variance in costs of agents for
population X1 and X2 respectively. We can see that not only vari-
ance in the costs of agents is minimum for VMQ but the values are
also very close to the equilibrium values computed using potential
function minimization method.
7.2. Multi-Stage Traffic Routing
We use the same network provided in Figure 1 to depict a traffic
network where two population of agents X1 and X2 navigate from
nodeA to nodeB and from nodeE to node F respectively. Unlike
to the packet routing example, agents decide about their next edge
at every node. Available edges to population type at every node
remains the same as explained in the previous example. As the
decision is made at every node, the domain is an example of SNCG
where agents make a sequence of decision to minimize their long
term cost. Hence, the values of agents from a population at a given
node would be equal at equilibrium.
In this example, agents perform episodic learning and the episode
ends when the agent reach their respective destination nodes. The
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(a) DAR=0.4 (b) DAR=0.5 (c) DAR=0.6
(d) DAR=0.4 (e) DAR=0.5 (f) DAR=0.6
Figure 5: Mean reward of agents and variance in individual revenues comparison for taxi domain built from synthetic data
set
distribution of mass of population over all the nodes is considered
as state. We perform experiments with 100 agents of each type. Fig-
ures 3a and 3b show the variance in values of both the population.
Similar to the packet routing domain, the variance is minimum
for VMQ. Furthermore, we notice that for both single-stage and
multi-stage cases, the values of agents from X2 is affected only
by their own aggregated policy and fraction of agents from X1 se-
lecting path AC. However, for agents from X1, the values would
be different from single-stage case. For example, agents selecting
path ACDB and ADB would reach the destination node at dif-
ferent time steps and hence cost of agents on edge DB would be
different from the single-stage case. Hence we can safely assume
that the equilibrium value of agents from X2 would be 1.22 as
computed for the single-stage case which is the value for VMQ as
shown in Figure 3b.
7.3. Taxi Simulator
Inspired from (Verma et al., 2019) we build a taxi simulator based
on both real-world and synthetic data set. Using GPS data of
a taxi-fleet, the map of the city was divided into multiple zones
(each zone is considered as a local state) and demand between
any two zones is simulated based on the trip information from the
data set. We also perform experiments using synthetic data set
where demand is generated based on different arrival rate. We use
multiple combinations of features such as: (a) Demand-to-Agent-
Ratio (DAR): the average number of demand per time step per
agent; (b) trip pattern: the average length of trips can be uniform
for all the zones or there can be few zones which get longer trips
(non-uniform trip pattern); and (c) demand arrival rate: arrival
rate of demand can either be static w.r.t. the time or it can vary
with time (dynamic arrival rate). At every time step (decision and
evaluation point in the simulator), the simulator assigns a trip to
the agents based on the number of agents present at the zone and
the customer demand. Also, demand expires if it is not assigned
within few time steps.
As agents try to maximize their long term revenue, we also provide
mean reward of agents (with respect to the time) as the learning
progresses and show that VMQ learn policy which yield higher
mean values. The mean reward plots are for the running average
of mean payoff of all the agents for every 1000 time steps.
Figure 4 show results for simulation based on the real-world data
set. Plot in Figure 4a show that agents earn ≈5-10% more value
than NFSP and MFQ. Boxplots in Figure 4b exhibit that the vari-
ance in the values of individual agents is minimum for VMQ. As
agents are playing their best response policy and variance in values
is low as compared to other algorithms, we can say that VQM
learn policy which is closer to the equilibrium policy.
Figure 5 show results for synthetic data set where we include
results for various combination of features. Figures 5a and 5d plot
mean reward and variance in values of agents for a setup with
dynamic arrival rate, non-uniform trip pattern with DAR=0.4. The
mean reward for VMQ is ≈8-10% higher that NFSP and MFQ.
Figures 5b and 5e show results for a setup with dynamic arrival
rate, uniform trip pattern and DAR=0.5. VMQ outperforms NFSP
and MFQ by ≈5-10% in terms of average mean payoff of all the
individual agents. Comparison for an experimental setup with
static arrival rate, non-uniform trip pattern and DAR=0.6 is shown
in Figures 5c and 5f. Similar to other setups, mean reward for
VMQ is ≈5-10% more than NFSP and MFQ respectively. For all
the setups the variance in values of individual agents is minimum
for VMQ. Hence VMQ provides better approximate equilibrium
policies.
8. Conclusion
We propose a Stochastic Non-atomic Congestion Games (SNCG)
model to represent anonymity in interactions and infinitesimal
Value Variance Minimization for Learning Approximate Equilibrium in Aggregation Systems
contribution of individual agents for aggregation systems. We show
that the values of all the agents present in a local state are equal at
equilibrium in SNCG. Based on this property we propose VMQ
which is a centralized learning decentralized execution algorithm
to learn approximate equilibrium policies. Experimental results on
multiple domain depict that VMQ learn better equilibrium policies
than the other state-of-the-art algorithms.
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